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ment, guided by CPA precedent, held void a summons and complaint naming only a deceased person as plaintiff. Formerly, the
name of the executor Qr administrator was required to be included.77
The rationale behind the rule was that since a deceased person
could not institute an action, the court, in such a situation, obtained
no jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court of Appeals, however,
unanimously reversed this decision,73 holding that such a defect
constituted nothing more than an irregularity, subject to correction
under CPLR 2001.79
CPLR 2001 (formerly CPA § 105) is the general provision
authorizing the courts to ignore or correct non-prejudicial defects
or irregularities in procedure. There are, in addition, many specific
remedial provisions in the CPLR designed to correct particular
These provisions abrogate the strict approach to prodefects. 8s
cedural irregularities which dictated the decision of the appellate
division in the Rosenberg case.
Although correction of a defect or irregularity may not be
expressly provided for, practitioners should urge the courts to
analyze defects in light of the liberal policy of the CPLR. The
practitioner should demonstrate to the court, by analogy, that the
defect in question comes within the purview of the CPLR's general
corrective provision.
ARTiCLE 30-

REmXEDIES AND PLEADING

CPLR 3012(1): Action dismissed for failure to ser'e a complaint.
In Friedman v. Guthrie,"" the action was commenced in February, 1963, two days before it would have been barred by the
statute of limitations. The defendant appeared promptly but was
not served with a complaint. Approximately one year thereafter,
defendant made a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute which
limitations. In Grippo, had the summons been declared a nullity the statute of
limitations would have prevented the executor from commencing a subsequent
action.
77 Lawson v. L. IL Mack, Inc., 246 App. Div. 622, 284 N.Y. Supp. 381
(2d Dep't 1935).
7s Rosenberg v. Caban, 16 N.Y.2d 905, 212 N.E.2d 151, 264 N.Y.S.2d 697
(1965).

79 CPLR 2001 permits the correction of non-prejudicial irregularities at
any8 0stage of the proceeding, upon such terms as may be just.
See, e.g., CPLR 103(c)-no dismissal where civil proceeding brought in
improper form; CPLR 203(e)-saves action from bar of statute of limitations when mistake in pleading requires claim to be asserted in an amended
pleading; CPLR 305(c)-permits correction of non-prejdicial defects in
process of proof of service; CPLR 325(a) and (b)-provides for transfer of
action when commenced in wrong court

8124 App. Div. 2d 966, 265 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Ist Dep't 1965).
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was granted with leave to plaintiff to move to vacate upon a proper
affidavit of merits. A subsequent motion by plaintiff to vacate was
granted. On appeal, the appellate division, first department, held
that plaintiff's motion should not have been granted since she
both failed to adequately explain the failure to serve the complaint
and neglected to present an "adequate" affidavit demonstrating the
merits of the action.
CPLR 3216 provides for dismissal when a plaintiff unreasonably
neglects to proceed with the prosecution of an action. CPLR
3012(b) 82 provides for dismissal where a plaintiff does not serve
a complaint within twenty days from demand. Under the predecessor of CPLR 3012(b), dismissals were granted where there was
neither an adequate
excuse for the delay nor a showing of the
3
claim's merit.

Some courts have been inclined to treat a prolonged failure
to serve a complaint under CPLR 3012(b) as a failure to prosecute.8 4 In such cases, the courts have not as a rule been concerned
with the technical "labels" to be placed upon the motion, but have
dismissed on either or both grounds. Since the service of a
complaint is an integral step in the prosecution of a plaintiff's cause
of action, it seems logical that a failure to pursue this step should
result in a finding of a neglect to prosecute, especially if the delay
is lengthy and unjustified.
In Keogh v. New York Post Corp.,8 5 the appellate division,
first department, held that where the plaintiff delayed in serving
the complaint for fourteen months, a dismissal was warranted in
the absence of an adequate affidavit of merit. In Keogh, the court
did not seem disturbed by the fact that it held a failure to serve
a complaint under CPLR 3012(b) to be a valid ground for a
CPLR 3216 motion.
It does not appear to be material how the defendant labels
his motion to dismiss, and even if he labels it as a motion to
82CPLR 3012(b) provides in part that: "If the complaint is not served
with the summons, the defendant may serve a written demand for the complaint. If the complaint is not served within twenty days after service of the
demand, the court upon motion may dismiss the action...."
83 CPA §257; see The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST.
JoHN's L. Rav. 406, 441 (1965).
84 The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. Ray.
303, 325-27 (1966), contains a discussion of the interrelationship between the
provisions of CPLR 3012(b) and CPLR 3216, and, in turn, their relationship
to the statute of limitations' extention under CPLR 205(a).
8522 App. Div. 2d 659, 253 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1964). Again, in
Flannery v. Stewart, 22 App. Div. 2d 786, 254 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1st Dep't
1964), the first department held that where no complaint had been served for
at least eight months, and where the excuse tendered was inadequate and
there had been no adequate demonstration of merit, a dismissal was warranted.
See also Sortino v. Fisher, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't
1963); 7B McKIMNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 169 (1964).
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dismiss for neglect to prosecute under CPLR 3216, he would not
have to adhere to the forty-five-day demand requirement under
that section as a condition for the motion 6 A plaintiff is, therefore, well advised to adhere to the defendant's demand for the
complaint. Failure to do so will result in a dismissal of his action
unless the court is satisfied with his excuse and finds sufficient merit
in his cause of action to disregard the delay.
CPLR 3016(c): Bill of particularsnot a satisactory alternative for
insufficient cornplaint.
In Pustilaik v. Pustilnik,z the appellate division, second department, held that a complaint in a separation action which failed to
specify the time and place of each act complained of was insufficient
pursuant to CPLR 3016(c), and, that such information contained
in a bill of particulars would not be a satisfactory alternative.
It is a rule of construction that one must view specific statutory
enactments in context with relevant general provisions. The
fundamental pleading requirement of the CPLR is contained in
section 3013 which provides that pleadings are sufficient if notice
of the elements of the cause of action or defense is conveyed to
0s
judicial confirmation was
the adversary. In Foley v. D'Agostino,
given to the revisers' intent to remove the unsubstantial "technicalities" from the pleading provisions. CPLR 3016(c), s 9 however,
requires that, in a separation action, the time and place of each
act complained of be specifically stated. The problem is, therefore,
whether a failure to comply with the requirements of CPLR
3016(c) should give rise to a dispositive motion under the CPLR.
It is difficult to give a definitive answer to this problem, but
some case law has already indicated a judicial tendency in this
area.90 In Crossett v. Crossett,9 1 a separation action, the court held
that the plaintiff does not cure the omissions in his pleading by
stating them in affidavits opposing a motion to dismiss the complaint.
The court cited Kurcz v. Kurcz,92 which held that a bill of particulars
see
83 7B McKu NEY'S CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 48, 49-51 (1965);
also 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 160. 169 (1965).
87 24 App. Div. 2d 868, 264 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1965).
88 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1964).
89 Subdivision (c) of CPLR 3016 is substantially the same as its predecessor RCP 280.
90
See, e.g., St Germain v. St. Germain (Sup. Ct. Queens County), 150
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1963, p. 17, col. 2. The court held therein that the failure
to carry out the requirements of CPLR 3016(c) constituted a defect which
made the pleadings insufficient and subjected them to a motion to dismiss
under CPLR 3211(a) (7).
91 150 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1963, p. 16, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
The court in
92 13 App. Div. 2d 954, 216 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1961).
the instant case also cited Kurcz. See also Rizzi v. Rizzi, 279 App. Div. 676,
108 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dep't 1951).

